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I AM A VICTIM TOO: APPLYING THE “DUAL VICTIM-







New York has two separate judicial systems within Family Court: one 
for children who are considered “victims,” and another for those who are 
considered “offenders.” Children whose parents are suspected of 
abuse/neglect are placed in dependency court, under the guise that the state 
must step in as parens patriae to protect the well-being of the child.1 On the 
other hand, children who are accused of committing a crime are placed in 
delinquency court, with the purpose of protecting society and holding the 
youth accountable for their actions, while also attempting to rehabilitate 
them.2 However, often the same social and familial circumstances lead 
children to become involved in both systems, simultaneously yet separately 
becoming both the “victim” and the “offender” in the eyes of the court. 
Despite recent efforts to reform the family court system, New York fails to 
address the needs of youth who are involved in both delinquency and 
dependency court. 
This paper first examines the separate theoretical and historical 
foundations of both New York dependency and delinquency court, 
including their differing rationales and treatment of children. Part II of this 
                                                
* Nikki received her B.A. from Temple University in 2011 and her J.D. from CUNY 
School of Law in 2015. She currently lives in Pittsburgh, PA and is a licensed attorney in 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania focusing on family law and child advocacy. Nikki 
would like to thank her husband, Eric Whetstone, and CUNY Law Professor Ann Cammett 
for their overwhelming support, encouragement, and guidance. 
1 See generally N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1011 (McKinney 2015). 
2 See generally FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1. 
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paper evaluates the correlation between victimization and offending, and the 
connection between dependent youth and their subsequent involvement in 
the delinquency system (“dual-status youth”). Finally, part III explores the 
“dual victim-offender” framework and offers this as a lens to be used by 
Family Court to inform their view of children and, in turn, reform the way 
children are treated in the system. 
 
I. HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF CHILDREN AND THE COURT SYSTEM 
 
A. Delinquency Court 
 
The concept of “delinquency” was not established in New York until 
1909.3 Prior to that, New York followed common law principles of criminal 
responsibility and tried all defendants in criminal court regardless of age.4 
Children aged 16 and older were considered adults and tried in criminal 
court.5 In addition, children aged 7–14 also could be tried as an adult in 
criminal court as long as the state demonstrated “beyond all doubt and 
contradiction” that the child knew the difference between “good and evil” 
and understood the consequences of their actions.6 Conviction resulted in 
the child being placed in an adult prison to serve his or her sentence. 
In the early-to-mid 19th century, the children’s rights movement began 
to gain momentum in the United States.7 The movement’s 20th century 
accomplishments included federal maternity and infancy health programs,8 
the enactment of child labor laws,9 and the establishment of public benefit 
programs10 to help alleviate the rampant effects of poverty on children.11 
                                                
3 MERRIL SOBIE & GARY SOLOMON, 10 NEW YORK FAMILY COURT PRACTICE § 10:1 




7 See id. 
8 See generally Maternity and Infancy (Sheppard-Towner) Act, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224 
(1921) (lapsed 1929). 
9 See generally, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 75-178, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 
1060 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219). 
10 See generally, e.g., Child Nutrition Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-642, § 17, 80 Stat. 885 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1786) (creating the Special Supplemental Nutrition 
Program for Women, Infants and Children (“WIC”)); Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-
271, §§ 401-406, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (repealed 1996) (creating the Social 
Security’s Aid to Dependent Children); 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2015) (granting benefits to 
children of deceased Social Security beneficiaries). 
11 David Walls, Children’s Rights Movement, SONOMA ST. U., 
http://www.sonoma.edu/users/w/wallsd/childrens-rights-movement.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/2FTA-UQYB]. 
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Within this children’s rights movement, advocates also focused on 
reforming how the criminal system handled children who committed a 
crime.12 Reformers viewed the criminal system, which focused on the 
punishment of the defendant, as particularly inadequate in the context of 
children-offenders who needed rehabilitation.13 Out of this movement, in 
1824, a charitable organization established an alternative placement 
program for “juveniles” convicted of a crime.14 Children under the age of 
14 were eligible for placement in the New York House of Refuge instead of 
a prison sentence.15 Asylums were also established to house very young 
children.16 
However, despite this rehabilitation movement, children who were sent 
to a house of refuge were often placed in a worse situation than those who 
were sent to prison or left on the streets.17 Children were placed in a house 
of refuge without any formal hearing, conviction or sentence.18 These 
houses of refuge had deplorable conditions and often developed into 
sweatshops.19 Many children were sent to farms in western United States.20 
The horrendous conditions in the houses of refuge and juvenile prisons 
led to a second wave of reformation in the mid-to-late 19th century that 
sought to establish a better alternative.21 In 1899, Illinois established the 
country’s first juvenile court system.22 Shortly thereafter, New York courts 
began issuing lesser sentences for juveniles in recognition that children 
needed to be treated differently than adults, and the New York Penal Law 
was amended to provide courts with the discretion to lower a felony charge 
to a misdemeanor for children under the age of 14.23 
New York continued to reform the criminal justice system by expanding 
the specialized treatment of children and establishing the concept of 
“delinquency” with the New York Penal Law of 1909 (“1909 Act”).24 The 
                                                
12 John P. Woods, New York’s Juvenile Offender Law: An Overview and Analysis, 9 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 3 (1980). 
13 Id. 
14 Our City Charities: The New-York House of Refuge for Juvenile Delinquents, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 23, 1860), http://www.nytimes.com/1860/01/23/news/our-city-charities-the-
new-york-house-of-refuge-for-juvenile-delinquents.html?pagewanted=all. 
15 Woods, supra note 12, at 3. 
16 Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (McKinney 
2015). 
17 Woods, supra note 12, at 3-4. 




22 Id. at 4. 
23 Id. 
24 Woods, supra note 12, at 4; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2186 (1909) (now codified at N.Y. 
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state established that children under the age of 16 would be classified as 
delinquent if they committed an act that would have been deemed a crime if 
committed by an adult.25 As such, the delinquent child could not be 
convicted of a crime or sent to an adult prison, but would be given a 
suspended judgment, probation, or be sent to an institution.26 
The 1909 Act is significant in the evolution of delinquency court for 
several reasons. First, it announced the framework of this new delinquency 
system: to view children as in “need of care and protection of the state” as 
opposed to treating the child as the “commission[er] of a crime.”27 In 
addition, the 1909 Act incorporated the “best interest of the child” standard 
into the disposition of children in the delinquency system.28 The statute 
requires the court to “consider the needs and best interests of the respondent 
as well as the need for protection of the community.”29 
However, all delinquency proceedings remained in criminal court and 
were heard by criminal court judges.30 It was not until 1922 that New York 
City established the state’s first independent children’s court.31 The 
Children’s Court, a division under the Domestic Relations Court, provided a 
tribunal for delinquency and dependency proceedings independent from 
criminal court.32 The rest of New York State established similar 
independent children’s courts; however, the state lacked consistency in 
what laws applied to this new court system and how they would be 
applied.33 
In the years following the establishment of the Children’s Court, courts 
struggled with how to treat the children in their system and what rights 
children were afforded.34 Courts began treating delinquency proceedings as 
distinct from criminal proceedings.35 The court system undertook a 
philosophical transformation; courts held that delinquency proceedings 
were not part of the criminal system, but rather an informal system with a 
quasi-civil component.36 The delinquency system was recognized for its 
                                                                                                                       
PENAL LAW §§ 30.0, 70.05 (McKinney 2016)). 
25 Woods, supra note 12, at 4. 
26 See id. at 4-6. 
27 Sobie, supra note 16. 
28 Id. 
29 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (McKinney 2015). 
30 SOBIE & SOLOMON, supra note 3, § 10:1. 
31 Sobie, supra note 16. 
32 Woods, supra note 12, at 5. 
33 Id. 
34 SOBIE & SOLOMON, supra note 3, § 10:1. 
35 Woods, supra note 12, at 5, 7; Jeffrey A. Butts & Ojmarrh Mitchell, Brick by Brick: 
Dismantling the Border Between Juvenile and Adult Justice, 2 CRIM. JUST. 2000 167, 170, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_2/02f2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P4Z-S8ZS]. 
36 Id. 
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rehabilitative purpose and developed under the principle of parens patriae: 
the state is the “parent” or protector of children who cannot protect 
themselves.37 With this foundational change, criminal procedural standards 
no longer applied to delinquency proceedings.38 
For many years, case law provided the only instruction for the purpose 
of delinquency court: to provide guidance and redemption of neglected and 
delinquent children.39 In 1962, the Family Court Act (FCA) was passed in 
New York providing due process rights to children in delinquency 
proceedings.40 In 1967, the Supreme Court decided In re Gault, which 
established that children have a federal constitutional right to due process in 
delinquency court.41 The FCA, along with the 1967 decision in In re Gault, 
changed the way children were viewed in delinquency court by 
reestablishing the procedural due process rights of children.42 This 
reestablishment of procedural due process rights resulted in the delinquency 
system moving back toward a quasi-criminal system and away from the 
parens patriae framework.43 
In 1976, the New York Juvenile Justice Reform Act (JJRA) codified the 
historical “best interest of the child” purpose of the delinquency court 
system, but also added the consideration of “the need for protection of the 
community.”44 This addition created a divide in how courts reconciled the 
two competing considerations. In 1979, three cases interpreted this purpose 
clause and the history of the delinquency system differently. The court in 
People v. Young determined that the JJRA codified the long-standing best 
interest purpose of delinquency court, but also changed the purpose by 
adding a secondary consideration in the protection of the community.45 
While the court in In re Rudy S. agreed with the Young court regarding the 
best interest consideration, it held that this dual purpose had been long-
standing in the history of delinquency court.46 The court in Rudy S. asserted 
that the protection of the community had been part of the delinquency 
court’s purpose since its inception, and the JJRA merely codified it.47 Either 
way, the JJRA is problematic for forcing courts to look at and weigh this 
                                                
37 See People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 177 (1932). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Sobie, supra note 16. 
41 See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
42 Sobie, supra note 16. 
43 Id. 
44 Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976, ch. 878, 1976 N.Y. Laws § 2 (codified at N.Y. 
FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (McKinney 2015)). 
45 People v. Young, 99 Misc. 2d 328, 330 (N.Y. Fam. Ct., Monroe Cty., 1979). 
46 In re Rudy S., 100 Misc. 2d 1112, 1119 (N.Y. Fam. Ct., Richmond Cty., 1979). 
47 See id. 
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secondary interest in the protection of the public, as it can prevent the courts 
from acting in the child’s best interest. 
On the other hand, the court in In re Elizabeth J. interpreted the statute 
as requiring the court to look at the best interest and needs of the child 
throughout the entire delinquency process, while additionally weighing the 
protection of the community only during the dispositional phase.48 This 
interpretation assumes that a disposition based solely on the needs and best 
interest of the child does not adequately protect the community. However, 
this reasoning is flawed; acting in the child’s best interest to ensure the best 
possible outcome for that youth will, in turn, also protect the community. It 
is never in the child’s best interest to place them in a position where they 
will reoffend.  Despite the codified definition of the delinquency court’s 
purpose in the JJRA, the varying interpretations of the definition which are 
found in Young, Rudy S., and Elizabeth J. demonstrate that there is still 
ambiguity and confusion regarding how the courts are to decide 
delinquency cases. 
Almost thirty years after the JJRA codified the delinquency court’s 
purpose, the court in In re Robert J. rearticulated this purpose: “to empower 
Family Court to intervene and positively impact the lives of troubled young 
people while protecting the public.”49 That court maintained the 
problematic dual purpose of delinquency court and failed to clarify their 
relationship.50 As evidenced by the courts’ varying interpretations, it is 
unclear how the two competing delinquency court purposes are to be 
weighed and applied. 
States began adopting harsher treatment of youth in the 1990s as a result 
of an unfounded criminology theory of the “superpredator.”51 This theory 
hypothesized that the United States would see a dramatic increase in violent 
crimes committed by youth in the coming decade.52 Proponent of the 
“superpredator” theory, John DiIulio, announced a “new breed of children” 
who are “so impulsive, so remorseless, that [they] can kill, rape, maim, 
without giving it a second thought.”53 Due to the perpetuation of this 
hysteria by criminologists and politicians, youth became increasingly 
stigmatized and a generalized fear grew in communities across the 
country.54 States, including New York, responded by increasing enumerated 
offenses and lowering age requirements of transfer laws, as well as 
                                                
48 In re Elizabeth J., 98 Misc. 2d 362, 363-65 (N.Y. Fam. Ct., N.Y. Cty., 1979). 
49 In re Robert J., 2 N.Y.3d 339, 346 (2004). 
50 Id. 
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mandating harsher sentences.55 
This theory of the “superpredator” was wholly disproved when studies 
concluded that youth offenses, including violent crimes, decreased from 
1993 to 1997.56 In 2001, Mr. DiIulio admitted that the “superpredator” 
theory was completely false, stating, “If I knew then what I know now, I 
would have shouted for prevention of crimes.”57 Unfortunately, most of the 
harsh laws enacted during the 1990s in New York remain in effect today 
despite the debunking of the “superpredator” theory.58 
There has been a recent effort in New York to reform juvenile justice 
laws. There is currently a “Raise the Age” campaign to raise the age 
requirement for criminal prosecution from 16 years of age.59 A bill was 
proposed in the New York Assembly which would have raised the 
jurisdictional age to 18 by amending or repealing portions of New York 
penal law, executive law, criminal procedure law, and the FCA.60 The 
purpose of this bill acknowledged several fundamental principles of 
juvenile justice, including the need for children to be treated in an age-
appropriate manner, and that juvenile incarceration has not been effective in 
the deterrence or prevention of crimes.61 However, this bill never made it 
out of committee.62 
Despite these recent reform efforts, the harsh laws initiated during the 
1990s “superpredator” era are still in place.63 In addition, the courts have 
failed to reconcile the two competing purposes of acting in the child’s best 
interest and protecting the community. The delinquency system retains a 
problematic foundation which jeopardizes the well-being of its children. 
 
                                                
55 Id. 
56 MICHAEL BOCHENEK, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO MINOR MATTER: CHILDREN IN 
MARYLAND’S JAILS (1999), http://pantheon.hrw.org/reports/1999/maryland/Maryland-
02.htm#P359_42894 [https://perma.cc/7JCX-Y236]. 
57 Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young ‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide Has 
Regrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/09/us/as-ex-theorist-
on-young-superpredators-bush-aide-has-regrets.html. 
58 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00(1) (McKinney 2015) (enumerating offenses for 
which thirteen, fourteen and fifteen-year-olds can be tried as adults); see also N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 130.91 (McKinney 2015) (enumerating sexual offenses for which thirteen, fourteen, 
and fifteen-year-olds can be tried as adults); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.05 (McKinney 2015) 
(providing guidelines for sentencing juveniles as adults). 
59 RAISE THE AGE N.Y., http://raisetheageny.com [https://perma.cc/FKA8-XHCB]. 
60 A.B. 3668, 200th Leg., Reg. Sess., (N.Y. 2013). 
61 Id. 
62 New York Assembly Bill 3668, LEGISCAN, 
https://legiscan.com/NY/bill/A03668/2013 [https://perma.cc/WRC9-6LRE]. 
63 Echoes of the Superpredator, supra note 51. 
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B. Dependency Court 
 
Until the mid-1800s, children who were abused or neglected were 
treated the same as delinquent children.64 These dependent children were 
placed in poorhouses, large orphan asylums, and refuge houses alongside 
delinquent children.65 New York had abuse and neglect laws that prohibited 
the use of excess corporal punishment and allowed the court to remove 
abused/neglected children from their caregiver.66 However, these laws were 
rarely enforced.67 Society in the United States at this time generally viewed 
children as the property of the father.68 Courts held that a husband was 
legally permitted to physically punish his wife and children because he was 
legally responsible for their actions.69 Parents had sole control and 
discretion over their children, who were also deemed their parents’ 
property.70 As such, abuse and neglect laws were very rarely utilized, except 
in extreme situations.71 These abuse/neglect laws were generally used to 
intervene in the lives of poor families where the child was deemed pre-
delinquent due to the conduct of the child or the parent.72 For example, 
these laws were used to remove children from a parent due to substance 
abuse, criminal conduct, or “other vices” because it exposed the child to an 
“idle and dissolute life.”73 
Child protection laws evolved and expanded throughout the 19th 
century.74 Ex parte Crouse75 was the first case to establish the court’s role 
                                                
64 See William Wesley Patton, Child Protective Services – Historical Overview, 




66 MARVIN VENTRELL, EVOLUTION OF THE DEPENDENCY COMPONENT OF THE 
JUVENILE COURT 11 (1998), 
http://www.juvenilelawsociety.org/upload/evolutionofthedependencycour.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SW5F-PYZP]. 
67 Id. at 16-17. 
68 See Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody, 4 CHILD. & DIVORCE 121, 
122 (1994). 
69 See, e.g., Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156, 156-57 (1824). 
70 VENTRELL, supra note 66, at 6. 
71 See John E.B. Myers, A Short History of Child Protection in America, 42 FAM. L.Q. 
449, 450 (2008). 
72 Id. at 450-51. 
73 Id. at 450. 
74 See Mary Ellen Wilson, AM. HUMANE ASS’N, 
http://www.americanhumane.org/about-us/who-we-are/history/mary-ellen-wilson.html 
[https://perma.cc/FP9C-E5UZ]. This movement began with the case of Mary Ellen Wilson. 
Id. 
75 Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839). 
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as parens patriae in cases of abuse/neglect.76  The court held that when a 
parent fails to adequately care for their child, the state has the duty to 
protect the child by intervening in the family, including the right to remove 
the child and step into care for him/her.77 In 1875, the Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children (SPCC) was founded in New York as a 
private organization to enforce child protection laws.78 The city contracted 
with the SPCC to investigate and prosecute abuse/neglect claims, and to 
remove and place abused/neglected children.79 
It was not until the 1960s with the passing of the FCA and the In re 
Gault decision that dependent children were distinguished from delinquent 
children in the court system. In re Gault’s holding that children in 
delinquency proceedings had a right to due process80 simultaneously 
cemented the fact that dependent children did not have such a right. As 
such, dependency court, a court deeply founded in the principle of parens 
patriae, was formally separated from delinquency court. In addition, the 
FCA refocused child protection laws and enforcement on parental acts of 
abuse and neglect as opposed to economic conditions.81 
NY FCA § 1011 established the purpose of dependency court: to “help 
protect children from injury or mistreatment and to help safeguard their 
physical, mental, and emotional well-being.”82 Dependency court permits 
the state to “intervene against the wishes of a parent on behalf of a child so 
that his needs are properly met.”83 Most dependency cases begin with a 
Child Protective Services (CPS) investigation and report of suspected 
abuse/neglect under NY Social Services Law § 413. Under NY Social 
Services Law § 411, the purpose of CPS is to protect abused or maltreated 
children “from further injury and impairment” as well as to provide 
“rehabilitative services for the child or children and parents involved.”84 
New York’s statutory law puts forth the view that abused and maltreated 
children are “victims” in need of protection and that the role of dependency 
court is as parens patriae. Dependency court’s purpose focuses solely on 
                                                
76 VENTRELL, supra note 66, at 14. 
77 Id.; Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. at 10. 
78 N.Y. SOC’Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, 
http://www.nyspcc.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2016). 
79 Patton, supra note 64. 
80 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
81 See, e.g., Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1011 
(McKinney 2015) (defining the purpose of dependency court to protect children from 
“injury or mistreatment and to help safeguard their physical, mental, and emotional well-
being”); Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 611 (McKinney 2015) 
(establishing grounds for permanent neglect). 
82 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1011 (McKinney 2015). 
83 Id. 
84 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 411 (McKinney 2015). 
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the wellbeing of the child. This differs significantly from the delinquency 
court’s purpose which must balance the wellbeing of the child against the 
needs of the community.85 
 
II. THE CORRELATION BETWEEN DEPENDENCY AND DELINQUENCY 
 
A.  The “Victim-Offender Overlap” 
 
Many studies have been conducted over the years analyzing what 
circumstances lead an individual to become a victim or perpetrator of crime. 
“Criminology” uses a multidisciplinary approach to explain the causes of 
criminal behavior and how to prevent criminal behavior in society.86 On the 
other hand, “victimology” attempts to explain who generally becomes a 
victim of a crime and why, as well as the psychological effects of such 
victimization on the victim.87 Until relatively recently, victimology was a 
subcategory of criminology and lacked much evidential study.88 It was not 
until the mid-20th century when criminologists began comparing the 
characteristics and experiences of offenders and victims that they 
discovered the “victim-offender overlap.”89 
The National Crime Survey (NCS) (a self-reporting victimization 
survey) became a prominent source for this information in the 1970s.90 
These surveys completely changed the views of criminologists regarding 
who was considered the typical “victim” and “offender.”91 Prior to these 
studies, criminologists generally posited the typical victim as the “white 
middle-aged woman” and the typical offender as the “unmarried young 
black man.”92 The surveys revealed that the same demographic group that 
was viewed as the typical offender, i.e., unmarried young black men, was 
also the same demographic that predicted the highest likelihood of 
victimization.93 Further research revealed that offenders and victims shared 
many of the same life experiences.94 This “victim-offender overlap” 
                                                
85 See infra Part III. 
86 See Chad Posick, UNTANGLING OFFENDING AND VICTIMIZATION: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF THE VICTIM-OFFENDER OVERLAP 21 (2013), 
https://repository.library.northeastern.edu/downloads/neu:2467?datastream_id=content 
[https://perma.cc/B2GG-XA7C]. 
87 See id. at 22. 
88 Id. at 22-23. 
89 Id. at 27. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 24-25. 
93 See id. at 26. 
94 Id. at 27. 
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discovery, that the same factors generally predict both victimization and 
offending, revolutionized how criminologists viewed the typical victim and 
offender. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, which 
highlighted the importance of these studies, provided “an accurate picture of 
juvenile offending and victimization risk is integral to a strategy to decrease 
violence.”95 
The development of the “victim-offender overlap” led many social 
scientists to begin studying criminology and victimology together in the 
hopes of developing a unified theory of predicting who is likely to be an 
offender or a victim.96 From this, they discovered that victims and offenders 
are often one and the same.97 This led to the development of the “cycle of 
violence”, the theory that “violence begets violence.”98 This theory holds 
that those who are victims of violence (whether by direct or vicarious 
trauma) are more likely to become perpetrators of violence, and vice 
versa.99 Specifically, the “cycle of violence” theory found a link between 
victimization through childhood/adolescent maltreatment and later 
becoming an offender.100 
In 1978, the New York State Assembly’s Select Committee on Child 
Abuse issued a “Summary Report on the Relationship Between Child 
Abuse and Neglect and Later Socially Deviant Behavior.”101 This report 
came out of the Committee’s investigation into the administrative and 
legislative shortcomings of New York’s child protective system. In its 
investigation, those in the child protective field brought to light the “social 
cost” of child maltreatment—that the same children who were declared 
dependent due to abuse/neglect were later becoming involved in the 
delinquency system.102 
Judge Nanette Dembitz of the New York City Family Court testified, 
“the root of crime in the streets is the neglect of children.”103 At the time of 
                                                
95 Id. at 25 (citing Rolf Loeber et al., Juvenile Delinquency and Serious Injury 
Victimization, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Aug. 2001), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/188676.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z92S-NFK7]). 






101 JOSE D. ALFARO, N.Y. STATE ASSEMB. SELECT COMM. ON CHILD ABUSE, 
SUMMARY REPORT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT AND 
LATER SOCIALLY DEVIANT BEHAVIOR (1978), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/50515NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ASE-
EFPZ]. 
102 See id. at 11. 
103 Id. at 2. 
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the report, there were very few, if any, empirical studies relating to the 
correlation between child maltreatment and delinquency. However, this 
investigation announced a “definite relationship between child maltreatment 
and juvenile misbehaviour and criminality.”104 Specifically, the Committee 
found that delinquency occurred at a higher rate among families who had a 
reported history of abuse/neglect than among those in the same community 
who did not have such a history.105 The report also found that an 
abused/neglected child was up to five times more likely to be found 
delinquent or ungovernable than a child in the general population.106 
Many studies conducted since the 1990s have validated the connection 
between victimization through child abuse/neglect and a heightened 
likelihood of becoming a juvenile delinquent or adult criminal offender.107 
In 1994, the National Institute of Justice completed a study on the “cycle of 
violence,” specifically focusing on the link between child abuse/neglect and 
criminal behavior.108 The study, which followed over 1,500 children for 
twenty-seven years, determined that children who had a substantiated case 
of abuse/neglect in dependency court were 59% more likely to be arrested 
as a juvenile delinquent, 28% more likely to be arrested as an adult, and 
30% more likely to be arrested for a violent crime.109 Therefore, the study 
suggests that not only does “violence beget violence,” but also child 
maltreatment of any kind (including both neglect and abuse) begets 
violence.110 Another study found that, while children of parents who were 
physically abused had the same likelihood of being abused as the general 
population, children of parents who were neglected or sexually abused were 
twice as likely to suffer the same abuse.111 
In 2005, a study found that, controlling for socio-demographic 
characteristics and prior delinquent behavior, maltreated children (including 
both abuse and neglect) were more than twice as likely to be arrested, 
commit a general offense, commit a violent offense, and use drugs through 
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early adulthood than those who were not maltreated.112 While historically 
neglect has not been studied with regard to its impact on the delinquency of 
youth,113 this study demonstrated that it in fact has a comparative effect to 
abuse.114 In addition, while neglect has its highest impact on delinquency in 
late adolescence, the negative effect of other types of abuse, such as sexual 
abuse, tends to manifest later in adulthood.115 
Therefore, these studies show a correlation between, not only 
victimization and criminal perpetration, but also specifically neglect/abuse 
and delinquency. The current binary court system does not take into account 
the causal connection between dependency and delinquency nor does it 
adequately address the needs of these children to prevent a continuation of 
the cycle of violence. 
 
III. APPLYING A NEW THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK TO THE FAMILY COURT 
SYSTEM 
 
The current family court system must be altered to account for the 
causal connection between dependency and delinquency in order to provide 
adequate services to children involved in these systems. Firstly, it is 
important to establish both a language and system that appropriately 
identifies children involved in both systems so that their specific needs can 
be met. In addition, a new framework must be used to view children in the 
dependency and delinquency systems and the role of the court in order to 
establish the necessary reforms. 
 
A. “Dual Status” Youth 
 
The RFK National Resource Center for Juvenile Justice (“the Center”), 
founded in Boston in 2004, has recently developed new language to 
enhance discussions surrounding issues relating to youth who have been 
involved with both dependency and delinquency court.116 The Center 
defines the term “dual status youth.”117 In addition to this general term of 
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“dual status youth,” the Center encourages distinction between different 
levels of involvement in the dependency and delinquency courts to reform 
these systems to better meet the needs of youth by developing more specific 
terms. Under the Center’s terminology, “dually identified youth” are those 
who were previously involved in the dependency system and who are 
currently involved in the delinquency system.118 “Dually involved youth” 
are those who are currently involved in both systems.119 Finally, “dually 
adjudicated youth” are those who have had both a finding of neglect in 
dependency court and a finding of delinquency in the juvenile justice 
system.120 
This newly-developed terminology is important to the reformation of 
the dependency and delinquency systems. It forces society to become 
conscious of this specific category of youth and the issues pertaining to 
them. While the correlation between dependency and delinquency has been 
established for decades, dual status youth, and the issues they face, are 
addressed independently by each system. This terminology would provide 
courts with the tools necessary to effectively discuss the issues pertaining to 
these youth and develop a cohesive plan in addressing them. It would assist 
jurisdictions in looking at dual status youth in a holistic manner and in 
developing a new area of law that directly focuses on them. 
 
B. The “Dual Victim-Offender” Framework 
 
In addition to implementing new terminology, it is also important to 
develop a new theoretical framework for addressing the issues of dual status 
youth. The current methods for dealing with delinquent youth are faulty. 
The delinquency system has had severe issues in both shaping its 
goals/premise and in its implementation.121 The delinquency system’s 
history shows that there is a serious tension in balancing its goals of acting 
in the child’s best interest while simultaneously acting to protect society. 
This has manifested in a tension of whether the delinquency system should 
be punishment-based or rehabilitative.122 In addition, over the past several 
centuries, the delinquency system has failed to successfully implement its 
policy goals, specifically in protecting youth. In many instances, the 
delinquency system has placed children in far worse conditions than they 
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were previously in.123 
It is crucial for delinquency courts to view youth not simply as 
“perpetrators,” but as whole individuals with a history of victimization and 
trauma. In “The ‘Monster’ in All of Us: When Victims Become 
Perpetrators,” Abbe Smith presents the life of Aileen Wuornos to criticize 
the dichotomy of the “victim” and “perpetrator” labels.124 Wuornos suffered 
severe physical and sexual abuse and neglect during her life.125 She engaged 
in sex work when she was a teenager, and eventually was convicted of 
killing seven men who were her clients.126 Smith’s article challenges the 
view that “there is a great divide between people to whom terrible things are 
done and people who do terrible things.”127 Smith states, “It is the rare 
perpetrator who has not also suffered.”128 She argues that the criminal 
justice system often embraces victims and then shuns those same 
individuals when they become perpetrators.129 She criticizes victim 
advocates and supporters who “abandon them [victims] when they repeat 
the behavior by acting out against others.”130 Ultimately, Smith argues for 
prosecutors to make “these critical connections” between victim and 
perpetrator.131 In the same way that Smith applies this “dual victim-
offender” framework to Aileen Wuornos, this framework needs to be 
applied to dual status youth. Without this comprehensive understanding, the 
state’s use of punitive measures while ignoring preventive and rehabilitative 
measures perpetuates the “cycle of violence.” This framework needs to be 
used in the context of dual status youth to inform the reformations 
necessary to both dependency and delinquency systems to provide a holistic 
response to the needs of these youth. 
 
C. Reforming the Dependency and Delinquency Systems 
 
Applying the dual victim-offender framework to dual status youth 
would lead to an entire restructuring of the family court system. Currently, 
the dependency and delinquency court systems are diametrically opposed; 
the same youth is viewed in one context solely as a “victim” and in the 
other context solely as an “offender,” despite the known close relationship 
                                                
123 Woods, supra note 12, at 3-4. 
124 Abbe Smith, The “Monster” in All of Us: When Victims Become Perpetrators, 38 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 367 (2005). 
125 Id. at 371-76. 
126 Id. at 368-69. 
127 Id. at 393. 
128 Id. at 369. 
129 See id. at 393. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
2016] I AM A VICTIM TOO  
 
91
between the two. The dual victim-offender framework shows that the court 
system needs to be structured so as to effectively treat a youth’s 
involvement in both systems, acknowledging the “critical connections” 
between the two.132 As such, the dependency and delinquency court systems 
should be united under one court system utilizing the same service 
providers and workers on an individual case to ensure a cohesive and 
holistic plan for dual status youth. 
Perhaps most importantly, this unified system must encompass the dual 
victim-offender framework in its purpose. This new system must act with 
the sole purpose of advancing the best interest of the child. The balance of 
the interests of the child against the perceived safety concerns of society 
needs to be eliminated. The best interest of the child will be advanced and 
any concerns for the safety/protection of the public will be adequately 
addressed if the courts focus on rehabilitation. 
Until a new uniform system is introduced, it is important for the records 
of dual status youth to be shared between all providers and parties in both 
the dependency and delinquency systems. While there are confidentiality 
laws in place to protect subject youth under NY SSL § 442-a, such laws 
must be amended to clearly permit the sharing of information between 
dependency and delinquency in order to effectuate a holistic approach in the 
cases of dual status youth. Even in circumstances where disclosure is 
permitted, parties involved in the cases are often unwilling to share 
information in fear of violating the confidentiality statute.133 Therefore, not 
only must the statute clearly permit such disclosure, but all workers on the 
case must also be accurately informed of the law to ensure communication 
among all parties in both systems. 
In addition to sharing information and records for those youth already 
involved in both systems, it is important that youth at risk of becoming dual 
status are identified when they first enter the system in order for the family 
to receive preventive services. The 1978 Summary Report concluded that 
the state needed to address the drastic lack of rehabilitative services 
provided to families involved in dependency court in order to counteract the 
negative effects of the abuse/neglect.134 The Committee records stated, “If 
we do not help children in trouble, they will grow up to make trouble.”135 
Nearly 30 years later, the 2005 study on the correlation between 
dependency and delinquency similarly argued for strengthened preventive 
and rehabilitative services for families dealing with abuse/neglect.136 
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Several studies have determined that early intervention in the lives of at-
risk families has reduced both child abuse/neglect and future 
delinquency.137 Such services include nurse home visits for at-risk pregnant 
women, parent skills training, health screenings, abuse screenings, and other 
various social services.138 Despite the strong evidence of a correlation 
between dependency and delinquency, both court systems fail to currently 
provide adequate preventive resources for families involved in the court 
system. Therefore, it is imperative not only to identify children at risk of 
becoming dual status early, but also to make preventive and early 
intervention resources available to their families. 
Unfortunately, because these reforms will initially require a significant 
monetary investment and the culture of the courts currently value punitive 
measures over rehabilitation, these reforms will meet resistance. 
Nevertheless, such measures must be adopted to provide adequate services 




The delinquency court system developed out of a recognition that 
children should be treated differently than adults. Delinquency court 
evolved over the following decades to act as parens patriae in the best 
interest of the child. However, this simultaneously resulted in a loss of 
children’s procedural due process rights. Eventually, the JJRA and In re 
Gault reestablished these rights for children while adding a second 
consideration of the protection of the community to the delinquency court’s 
purpose. This tension in purposes often results in the punitive treatment of 
children found to be delinquent, jeopardizing their best interest. 
Historically, dependent children were not distinguished from those who 
were delinquent in the eyes of the court and both were sent to an asylum or 
house of refuge. Eventually, the dependency court system was established 
separate from delinquency court with the purpose of protecting children in 
cases where their parents failed to do so. 
The maintenance of separate family court systems ignores the causal 
connection between dependency and delinquency. Children who are the 
subject of abuse and neglect are more likely to later become perpetrators of 
violence. The current family court system fails to acknowledge this 
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connection and perpetuates the cycle of violence by imposing punitive 
measures in delinquency court. The family court system must implement a 
new “dual victim-offender” framework to change the way it views and 
treats its children. This framework would require the courts to view 
delinquency as a product of past trauma and violence and treat dual status 
children in a holistic manner. In addition, the courts must also provide 
social services to families in dependency court to prevent the initiation of 
this cycle. The “dual victim-offender” framework must be implemented in 
the court system to ensure that dependent and delinquent children receive 
appropriate services. 
 
* * * 
